Thank you Viktor

Orban’s latest gamble forces Europe to make some fundamental decisions

Viktor Orban’s decision to block urgently needed European funds for Ukraine has triggered a familar scramble in Brussels to find ways that would allow the embattled Hungarian leader to climb down and free up the cash for Kiev. Usually this means that the EU commission agrees to disburse just enough money to allow Orban to claim victory domestically and move on. It’ s the main page from a playbook the bloc’s executive and the Hungarian government have used for years.

Well, things may not be that simple this time. For one Orban is facing a disenchanted domestic public which will head to the ballots in a handful of weeks. In some polls the populist leader is trailing by 20 percentage points. His tight grip on power could end soon, despite the Trump administration’s attempts to intervene in the political campaign. Thus, Orban may have concluded that seeking open confrontation with common institutions in Brussels could heed better results than extracting the typical minor pecuniary concessions from European partners. In other words if Orban has decided to dig in, attempts to appease him may go nowhere.

The standoff is a reminder of two familiar challenges Europeans have carefully avoided to tackle, one is to clearly define the level of support and commitment they are really willing to offer to allow Ukraine to push back Russian forces, the other is the need to find better and more predicticable ways to prevent European decision making processes from being serially blackmailed by individual member countries. This time there is also an additional twist to the story, one that should not be underestimated.

In fact, a shellacking of Orban at the polls would rob European populists of one of their founding fathers. The narrative that the old liberal democracies are doomed and will be replaced by Orban like ethno-populists all over Europe would need to be revisited. Once it becomes clear there is nothing inevitable about the populist march to power across the continent, the shine comes off rather quickly. Populists are watching what happens in Hungary. So is the EU commission and liberally minded member states. But it does not mean they can just sit back and wait for Orban to implode.

For one Ukraine needs to be funded urgently. Orban’s threat has highlighted the tentative and precarious nature of the decision taken last December to disbourse 90 billion euros to support Kiev’s war efforts and economy. Is was and still is the third best option amongst those available. As a reminder, Brussels was not allowed to use Russian frozen assets as collateral for a much bigger loan, not only because of Belgian resistance (that is where the assets are housed), but also because Italy and France ended up siding with the reluctant Belgian prime minister Bart de Wever. Nothing suggests that has changed. Even more controversial, at least amongst so called frugal states, was the option to issue a much bigger amount of common European debt to cover all the costs involved in supporting Ukraine. A « whatever it takes » like commitment that would have sent a powerful message to friends and foes alike. Unfortunately, that step requires unanimity. In any case, even that would not have been enough.

The inconvenient truth it that one year after the end of direct US financial support, Kiev still relies on American weaponry and technology to repel Russian attacks. In fact it is the lack of sufficient US anti aircraft rockets that explains why Moscow is managing to hit civilian targets more easily from the sky. At the same time, the recent inability of Russian frontline troops to access US Starlink satellite services has allowed Ukraine to stage a series of counterattacks along the line of contact.

And then there is the perennial problem of managing dissent within European ranks and avoid paralysis at the same time. Surely, Hungary’s move will reinforce all those that are looking for alternative ways to make decisions, and want to avoid the blackmail of consensus. European governments are already forming sub groups, coalition of the willing if you like, wherever the need arises. Even advocates for greater European integration admit that a pragmatic approach is needed to avoid paralysis. But the central question here is how many of the decisions taken by such subgroups can be placed within the legal framework of the treaties. Every time they are not, common institutions risk ending up relegated to a minor role. Over time enforcement of any common rule would become a purely political matter for governments to decide. Once the European institutional balance is out of whack, the much trumpeted European rule of law risks being eroded from within.

This is in fact the scenario preferred by governments that are ruled by populists or feel the pressure from their own domestic populist forces. It would be the triumph of the populist, intergovernmental take on Europe, even if Hungarian voters were to decide that the purely national approach to their own country and European affairs is counter productive.