The awakening
Recognizing Europe’s weaknesses could prove to be the first step towards its revival - but the clock is ticking
A few days ago a colleague who works for a big Anglo-American media conglomerate told me he was thinking about writing a piece on the difficulties in adapting to the reality of being the object rather than the subject of history. My friend was referring to Europe, and its role as a central subject of history for the past 500 years. His argument is that until recently, not least because of the lessons of World War II and the emergence of the European Union, the old continent never accepted or even thought that Europe could end up at the very margins of history. I gathered a few thoughts on the topic:
My friend indeed highlights what has become an obsessive focus of current European policymakers and leaders. Since U.S. president Donald Trump “flooded the zone” with domestic and foreign policy blitzes, the discussion and almost all steps undertaken by Europe’s leaders, from the muted response to U.S. tariffs to Ukraine, have all been about ensuring they can preserve their ‘seat at the table’, for fear of ending up on the menu. To make sure Europe can continue to be a subject rather than a mere object of history. This has been particularly true with respect to efforts to end the war in Ukraine, of course, where European security is directly threatened by imperialist Russia. Europe still sits at that table, but given the number of times it has been left out of the room, rather precariously.
European leaders have fully recognized that to preserve this precarious position soft power alone won’t do. A strong economy - arguably soft power’s main tool - and hard power considerations are now conflated. This is a relatively new development.
Until quite recently Europeans still believed that the bulk of norms and behavioral patterns that underpinned the old globalist agenda could still be preserved, perhaps with some adjustments. In Europe it was primarily Germany under her chancellor Angela Merkel that kept the globalist flame alive. She and most European leaders also believed that accepting and embracing the seemingly unstoppable forces of globally interconnected economies would enable them to continue to shape outcomes, to preserve the European ‘garden against the encroachment of the jungle’, as one senior EU official once put it. At the time to many champions of the old order, even the migration challenge proved that Europe had become an appealing field of dreams, like the U.S.. Hence, any American drift towards pure hard power considerations was always met with the same instinctive, dismissive reaction, fueled by appeals to rediscover the centrality of the rules based order - and thus of soft power - and accept the European place in it. That European illusion is gone.
In fact, most European leaders now recognize they are no longer in a position that would allow them to strong arm anybody into accepting their ideas, neither Trump, nor China’s ruler Xi Jingping , certainly not Russia’s Vladimir Putin. Closing a trade deal with parts of South America represents a commendable attempt to preserve a role for the old world, beyond the narrow confines of its geographical borders. Perhaps it will prove to be a rearguard action, a tired legacy of better times, or maybe it is a sign it is still worthwhile building on past achievements. Regardless, evidence of a loss of European power abounds, even when looking beyond the most obvious areas, such as the negligible role it now plays in the Middle East or its resistance to repeated attempts by Russia and the U.S. to keep the EU at the margins of diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine. France has been booted out of its former African colonies, where it still kept an important foothold and influence until recently. Even Germany, its economic model in need of an urgent overhaul, can no longer rely on past strengths. Both former European powerhouses are struggling.
Europeans are also well past the old Mars versus Venus debate (launched during the war on terror more than twenty years ago, when Europe was criticized by some US commentators for dismissing the role of hard power, was accused of living on peaceful planet Venus rather than on harsh and conflict ridden Mars). Europeans have finally realized they need to develop more of a military muscle, to at least become omnivores in world increasingly populated by carnivores. Germany’s rearmament plan, along with increased defense spending in Poland, the Baltics and the Nordics proves the point. I am not sure about others, such as the UK, France, or Italy, given their limited fiscal space. But it is clear that all European leaders continue to be wary of a massive populist backlash if they openly put their voters before a ‘cannons versus butter’ choice. They don’t seem to be sure their citizens recognize the gravity of the situation. Thus, political leaders are clinging on to the hope there may be scope for charting a middle course that leads to a world with a new balance of power, a soft landing of sorts that allows for a peaceful new world order to emerge, able to preserve some features of the old one. Paradoxically, even European populists fuel this underlying feeling. Rather than proposing a nationalist, assertive agenda and role, most populist parties in Europe, both on the right or left of the political spectrum, wish for their countries to disengage from the troubles of the world. The main difference is they take this thinking so far as to even push for a reduction of interdependencies between their countries and their neighbors.
Not surprisingly, current European leaders are all in damage control mode. They realize they need time to get their economies and militaries back on track. Excessively bold action risks domestic backlash. This apparent absence of quick fixes also reduces the scope for robust vocal European responses to various provocations, most of them hurled at Europe from Washington DC. Gaining time appears to be more important than short lived counter bluster. This behaviour should not be mistaken for the usual kicking the can down the road posture Europe takes on most of its challenges. Instead it is due to the belief it makes little sense to accelerate worst outcomes, such as a complete breakdown of the transatlantic alliance, especially if you are not yet fully prepared for that scenario. Also, why play Trump’s provocation game if domestic checks and balances in the U.S. may still kick in and make it increasingly difficult for his administration to continue to ‘flood the zone’? Finally, it is unclear whether the U.S. really intends to retreat from Europe. Rather, it seems to be seeking total dominance, and wants to force allies into the role of vassals, who share the burdens but are not allowed to mold decisions.
On the other hand, if the current European hegemon, the U.S., was to retreat, this would create a dangerous void. Europe would find itself squeezed between the far West and an encroaching East. It would be in the uncomfortable position that post war Germany had tried to avoid since the end of World war II. Of course, Russia would to try to fill the void, at least indirectly. But a politically and militarily strong European Union, based on common institutions and shared power, would be able to fend off Russian imperialism. But what if the EU became a collection of nation states with weak central institutions, a Gaullist version of its current self? Who would emerge as the continental hegemon in Europe then? Russia? Not necessarily. What if right wing ethno-populists became the rulers in key European nations, such as France or Germany?
So, yes, in answer to my friend’s question, Europe risks becoming the object of history. And the danger is particulalrly grave if populists gain power. One can see why the MAGA world wishes to oust traditional, liberal democratic governments in Europe. But that outcome is not a foregone conclusion. Europe can still play the role of a subject, sit at the table, so to speak. But time may be running out, especially if Trump insists on obtaining Greenland or completely abandons Ukraine.
As to the question about the central role Europe has played in history in the past 500 years? Let’s not be under any illusion. That role was buried by the war rubble in 1945. It was never fully recovered.

